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Non-Technical Summary
In this paper we apply a generic procedure developed by Harrison, Horridge and Pearson (1999)
in order to decompose the economic implications of the Kyoto Protocol at the cross-country
level. The total economic impact for each region is split into contributions from its own emission
abatement policy and those from other regions. Our analysis which is based on a large-scale
computable general equilibrium model for the world economy indicates that spillover effects are
an important consequence of multilateral carbon abatement policies. Emission mitigation by
individual developed regions may not only significantly affect economic development and
performance in non-abating developing countries but may also cause large changes in the
economic costs of emission abatement for other industrialized regions. Analyzing the individual
contributions across policy measures of abating countries, action on behalf of the United States
produces by far the largest spillovers to other countries. Major competitors such as Europe and
Japan benefit significantly from abatement in the US whereas the US - in turn - is hardly affected
by abatement policies of these regions. We calculate a cross-country matrix for monetary transfer
payments which would have to be assigned on a bilateral basis in order to provide compensation
for the Kyoto spillovers. We show that the contributions of individual policy changes to the
overall effect depend on the policy instrument. When we simply change from a price instrument
(taxes) to a quantity instrument (emissions) in order to meet the Kyoto commitments the
quantitative decomposition results change. However, the qualitative results remain robust
suggesting that the decomposition procedure provides a useful starting point for bilateral
negotiations on policy-relevant transfer payments across parties of the Framework Convention.
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Abstract
We decompose the economic implications of the Kyoto Protocol at the cross-country level,
splitting the total economic impact for each region into contributions from its own emission
abatement policy and those from other regions. Our analysis which is based on a large-scale
computable general equilibrium model for the world economy indicates that spillover effects are
an important consequence of multilateral carbon abatement policies.. We calculate a cross-
country matrix for monetary transfer payments which would have to be assigned on a bilateral
basis in order to provide compensation for the international spillovers associated with the
implementation of the Kyoto Protocol.
Zusammenfassung
Im Rahmen einer angewandten Gleichgewichtsanalyse untersuchen wir die ökonomischen
Auswirkungen des Kioto-Protokolls auf bilateraler Ebene. Hierzu zerlegen wir den gesamten
Wohlfahrtseffekt für jede Region in einen Anteil, der auf die eigene Emissionsminderungspolitik
zurückzuführen ist und die jeweiligen Anteile (internationale spillovers), die durch
Klimaschutzpolitiken in anderen Regionen verursacht werden. Es wird deutlich, daß inter-
nationale spillovers einen wesentlichen Beitrag zu den allgemeinen Gleichgewichtseffekten
multilateraler Politikmaßnahmen liefern. Wir berechnen eine Matrix von bilateralen Transfer-
zahlungen, die als Ausgangspunkt für politikrelevante Verhandlungen über Kompensationen für
internationale spillovers im Zuge der Umsetzung des Kioto-Protokolls dienen könnte.
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11 Introduction
Under the Kyoto Protocol, industrialized countries and economies in transition (Annex B
countries), have committed themselves to reduce their greenhouse gas emissions below 1990
levels in the period 2008 to 2012. Developing countries have argued that they carry only minor
historical responsibility for the increase in global CO2 concentrations and therefore have refused
any abatement commitment so far. At first glance, abstinence from domestic action seems to
insure the developing countries against potential costs from greenhouse gas abatement because
their economic development will not be constrained by domestic emission limits. However, in a
world where economies are increasingly linked through international trade, policy changes in one
country cause spillover effects to all trading partners via changes in the international prices, i.e.
the terms of trade.
In this context, developing countries are concerned that abatement strategies in Annex B
countries negatively affect their economic development and welfare. The developed world as a
large trading block might exploit international market power and influence international prices at
the expense of its trading partners in the developing world, hereby passing on some fraction of
the costs of abatement (“beggar-thy-neighbor” policy). The Kyoto Protocol explicitly reflects
these concerns postulating that developed countries “...shall strive to implement policies and
measures ... in such a way as to minimize adverse ... economic impacts on other Parties,
especially developing countries Parties ...“ (UN 1997, Article 2, paragraph 3). On the other hand,
the developed Annex B countries fear adverse changes in the terms of trade from unilateral
abatement, because their energy use will be taxed, while there will be no taxes in the developing
world, hence they can expect to lose competitiveness in energy-intensive goods.
In the policy debate, the issue of induced changes in terms of trade is linked to demands
for adjustment mechanisms which provide more or less explicit compensation for "unfair"
spillovers. The developing world is guaranteed compensation by Annex B for induced economic
costs under Articles 4.8 and 4.9 of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate
Change (UNFCC 1992). In turn, the developed world argues for compensation1 if unilateral
abatement policies provide economic gains to non-abating non-Annex B countries. This
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 Compensating measures also include proposals for border taxes on energy intensive imports and border subsidies
on energy-intensive exports in order to mitigate negative shifts in comparative advantage.
2argument may be supported by fair division theory stating that "no-one should benefit from the
emission abatement burdens of others" (Helm 1999, p.11). Moulin, for example, argues that "fair
division conveys the idea of no subsidization: the presence of other agents who are willing to pay
higher monetary transfers than me for consuming the resources should not turn to my advantage"
(Moulin 1992, p. 1333).2
Of course, the debate on compensation for adverse spillovers does not only take place
between the developed and the developing world, but also among countries of the respective
groups (see, e.g., the bargaining process on burden sharing within the EU; Böhringer, Harrison
and Rutherford 1998).
The comprehensive policy evaluation of abatement strategies with respect to the
distribution of potential costs and benefits across countries requires quantitative assessment of
how economic performance in a specific country will not be only affected by its own action, but
also by those of other regions. There is a need for uncovering the sign and the magnitude of
multilateral spillovers from policy interference through international channels.
In this paper we apply a generic procedure developed by Harrison, Horridge and Pearson
(1999) in order to decompose the economic implications of the Kyoto Protocol at the cross-
country level. The total economic impact for each region is split into contributions from its own
policy changes and those from other regions. Apart from qualitative insights into the sources of
economic gains and losses across countries, the decomposition allows the measurement of the
individual contributions of changes in exogenous policies (in our case: multilateral abatement
measures) to the overall change in endogenous economic variables. In principle, were they able
to agree on model structure and parameters, policy makers could use such information as a
reference point for negotiating bilateral transfer payments according to some agreed equity
principles.
For the implementation and application of the decomposition by Harrison, Horridge and
Pearson, we use a static large-scale computable general equilibrium model of the world economy.
Our key findings can be summarized as follows:
• Emission constraints as mandated under the Kyoto Protocol induce significant spillovers from
abating Annex B countries to non-abating Non-Annex B regions. Compliance with the Kyoto
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 This contrasts to the position of some authors explicitly arguing that climate change protection strategies should be
designed such that they favor developing countries (Simonis 1996).
3targets through national abatement measures imposes welfare losses for all OECD regions
whereas developing regions with exception of large energy exporters may increase welfare
due to gains in comparative advantage.
• Analyzing the individual contributions across policy measures of abating countries, action on
behalf of the United States produces by far the largest spillovers to other countries. Major
competitors such as Europe and Japan benefit significantly from abatement in the United
States whereas the United States - in turn - is hardly affected by abatement policies of these
regions.
• Among developing countries, Brazil and India gain from action of all OECD countries,
whereas the reverse is true for energy exporting developing regions.
• Although the specific quantitative values for the decomposed bilateral spill-overs depend on
the policy instrument (here: taxes versus permits) the qualitative results remain robust.
Translation of decomposed welfare effects into a matrix of bilateral transfer payments could
therefore provide a starting point for bilateral negotiations on compensation negative
international spillovers from domestic abatement policies.
The paper is organized as follows: section 2 provides a description of the decomposition
technique; section 3 lays out the model framework in use for the impact analysis of Kyoto;
section 4 discusses the numerical results; and section 5 concludes.
2 The General Equilibrium Decomposition Technique
General equilibrium provides an established micro-consistent approach for evaluating the impacts
of public policy on resource allocation (efficiency) and the associated changes in income for
economic agents ("equity"). It has been, and still is, widely used in analytical work for assessing
policy measures, such as tax reforms, where market interactions potentially play an important
role. However, for the sake of tractability, analytical approaches are typically rather simple and
not sufficiently complex for applied policy analysis. Therefore, numerical models are commonly
used to accommodate the systematic analysis of economic problems where analytical solutions
are either not available or do not provide adequate information.3
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 For surveys on the use of numerical models in different fields, see e.g. Bergmann 1990, Kehoe and Kehoe 1994,
Shoven and Whalley 1992, Peireira and Shoven 1992.
4The main virtue of complex computational general equilibrium (CGE) models, i.e. the
comprehensive and consistent quantification of direct and indirect policy impacts, constitutes also
the major challenge for their use. As various partial effects, which may work in opposite
directions, contribute to the overall effect, it can get very difficult to explain in depth the
aggregate policy outcome. Numerical applications inherit some ambiguity in the interpretation of
the results as long as it is not possible to make transparent the sign and the magnitude of
individual effects. Therefore, procedures which allow the decomposition of general equilibrium
effects in a meaningful way are very helpful for the understanding and interpretation of policy
simulations. A deliberate decomposition not only facilitates analysis of the various sources of the
total effects but also assures a more rigorous check for the correct numerical implementation of
policy questions.4
In the context of multilateral policy appraisal, Böhringer and Rutherford (1999) present a
decomposition that splits the overall economic effect into a domestic market effect keeping
international prices constant, and an international market effect as a result of changes in
international prices (terms of trade effect).5 In other words, the decomposition allows separation
of the primary effect of domestic policy action from the secondary burden or benefit transmitted
via changes in international prices. Yet, the procedure is not suited for quantifying how much of
the total economic impact for one specific region is due to its own action and what is contributed
by the individual actions of other regions. Harrison, Horridge and Pearson (1999, henceforth
"HHP") propose a linear decomposition methodology for calculating the contributions of multiple
exogenous policy instruments to the resulting changes in individual endogenous variables.
The HHP method may be best explained along a simplified example where an
endogenous variable Z can be expressed as an explicit function of a vector X of exogenous
variables (policy instruments):
),...,,()( 21 nxxxFXFZ == .
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 Typically, CGE models are calibrated to a benchmark data set in economic flows for given values of elasticities.
The replication check of the benchmark equilibrium serves as a test for the consistent integration of data, but does
not assure "proper" economics.
5
 The key idea is that each region of a multi-region model can be represented as a small open economy in order to
separate the domestic policy effect under fixed terms of trade. The changes in international prices can then be
imposed parametrically on the small open economy to yield the full policy as previously calculated in the multi-
region framework.
5We consider the effects of a change in X which induces a change in Z, Z∆ . One way of
decomposing the total change Z∆  in the endogenous variable with respect to the individual
contributions from exogenous variables would be a sequential approximation of the impacts of
one exogenous variable while keeping all others constant (see e.g. Huff and Hertel 1997).
Assuming that F is differentiable, the contribution of a change in the exogenous variable xi which
moves from the initial value xi0 to the new value xi1 can then be computed as the line integral:
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For the numerical computation, the total change in the exogenous variable ix∆  is divided
into sufficiently small steps in order to approximate the line integral through linearization.
When F is nonlinear, the total change from shocks in exogenous variables can not be
decomposed in additive line-integrals for each exogenous variable starting from the same
reference (initial) value Z0. The impact of a change in an exogenous variable must be calculated,
taking into account the contributions of previous changes in other exogenous variables. This
implies that the decomposition is potentially sensitive to the sequential ordering of changes in the
exogenous policy variables. As there are n! ways of sequential ordering of n exogenous variables,
one quickly ends up with a large number of possible (different) decompositions for relatively
small-scale policy experiments.6
For many policy packages no decomposition might be obviously more plausible than the
rest. HHP therefore suggest an order-independent "natural " way of calculating contributions. On
the "natural" path, the exogenous variables move together towards their final value along a
straight line between their starting values 0X  and the final values 1X . The straight line between
these points is obtained by changing the elements of X  as a differentiable function H of some
parameter t holding the rate of change in the exogenous variables constant along the path
(where )(),( 110 tHXtHX o == ).
Figure 1 illustrates the difference between the sequential method of decomposition and
the HHP approach.
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 In our policy simulation of Kyoto we assess the differential impacts of  6 emission abating countries, which yields
720 possible ways of  decomposing the total effect.
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Figure 1: Sequential ordering versus "natural "path
In contrast to travelling on alternative combinations along the edges of the policy cube,
the HPP method follows a straight line between the pre- and post-simulation values.
For n exogenous variables, multivariate calculus tell us that the total change in the
endogenous variable is equal to:
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This concept is easily generalized to the case where the relationship between exogenous
and endogenous variables is implicit, which is typically the case for applied general equilibrium
models.
As HHP point out, it is possible to calculate numerical values for the gradients 
dt
dx
x
F i
i∂
∂
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all points of the "natural" path by solving a system of linear equations. The individual
contributions of changes in policy instruments xi can then be approximated through linearization
of the respective line integral which involves solving a system of linear equations R times, where
7R renders a sufficiently small step-size Rt /∆ .7 Appendix A provides the concrete description of
how the decomposition can be implemented numerically.
3 Model Specification and Baseline Calibration/Parametrization
For our analysis we use a static 8-sector, 13-region CGE model of the world economy. The
choice of sectors captures key dimensions in the analysis of greenhouse gas abatement such as
differences in carbon intensities and the scope for substitutability across energy goods and
carbon-intensive non-energy goods. The regional aggregation covers the Annex B parties as well
as major non-Annex-B regions which are central to the greenhouse gas issue.8 Table 1
summarizes the sectors and regions incorporated in our model.
Table 1: Overview of sectors and countries/regions
Sectors Regions
COL Coal CAN Canada
CRU Crude oil CEA Central European Associates
GAS Natural gas EUR Europe (EU15 and EFTA)
OIL Refined oil products FSU Former Soviet Union (Russian Federation and Ukraine)
ELE Electricity OOE Other OECD (Australia and New Zealand)
EIS Energy-intensive sectors JPN Japan
Y Manufactures and services USA United States
CGD Savings good ASI Other Asia (except for China and India)
BRA Brazil
CHN China
IND India
MPC Mexico and OPEC
ROW Rest of World
3.1 Nontechnical Model Overview
This section provides a non-technical summary of the model. The algebraic model documentation
is given in Appendix B.
Primary factors include labor, capital and fossil-fuel resources. Labor and capital are
intersectorally mobile within a region but cannot move between regions. A sector-specific
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 Note that the perspective on spillovers by HHP is different from Böhringer and Rutherford (1999). In the HHP
approach, the individual contributions from exogenous policy changes include both changes in domestic as well as
changes in international prices, whereas Böhringer and Rutherford separate domestic from international markets.
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 The aggregation is based on the GTAP-E data base which reconciles the GTAP economic production and trade
dataset (Mc Dougall 1997) with OECD/IEA energy statistics (IEA 1996) for 45 regions and 23 sectors (Babiker and
Rutherford 1998). See Appendix C for the mapping of GTAP regions and sectors with respect to the definitions of
Table 1.
8resource is used in the production of primary fossil fuels (crude oil, coal and gas), resulting in
upward sloping supply schedules for those goods.9
Production of commodities other than primary fossil fuels is captured by aggregate
production functions which characterize technology through substitution possibilities between
various inputs. Nested constant elasticity of substitution (CES) cost functions with three levels
are employed to specify the KLEM substitution possibilities in domestic production between
capital, labor, energy and material (non-energy) intermediate inputs. At the top level, non-energy
inputs are employed in fixed proportions with an aggregate of energy, capital and labor. The
material input of good i in sector j corresponds to a CES Armington aggregate of non-energy
inputs from domestic production and imported varieties. At the second level, a CES function
describes the substitution possibilities between the energy aggregate and the aggregate of labor
and capital. Finally, at the third level, capital and labor trade off with a constant elasticity of
substitution. As to the formation of the energy aggregate, we allow sufficient levels of nesting to
permit substitution between primary energy types as well as substitution between a primary
energy composite and secondary energy, i.e. electricity.
In the production of fossil fuels, labor, capital and fossil fuel inputs are aggregated in
fixed proportions at the lower nest. At the top level, this aggregate trades off with the sector-
specific fossil-fuel resource at a constant elasticity of substitution. The latter is calibrated in
consistency with exogenously given price elasticities of fossil fuel supplies.
Final demand in each region is determined by a representative agent who maximizes his
utility subject to a budget constraint with fixed investment (i.e. given demand for the savings
good). Total income of the representative household consists of factor income and taxes10. Final
demand of the representative agent is given as a CES composite which combines consumption of
an energy aggregate and a non-energy consumption bundle. Substitution patterns within the non-
energy consumption bundle are reflected via Cobb-Douglas functions with an Armington
aggregation of imports and domestic commodities. The energy aggregate in final demand consists
of the various energy goods trading off at a constant elasticity of substitution.
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 This model does not account for imperfectly competitive behavior on the part of oil exporting countries.
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 In the benchmark, the model includes taxes on output, intermediate inputs, exports and  imports, as well as taxes
on final demand.
9All commodities are traded internationally. Crude oil is imported and exported as a
homogeneous product, subject to tariffs and export taxes. For all other commodities, we adopt the
Armington assumption of product differentiation.
An important caveat with respect to the model formulation adopted here concerns the
representation of intertemporal issues. In the absence of an endogenous response of capital to
changes in rates of return, the static model may fail to account for some important mechanisms
through which carbon taxes affect the global economy. We leave to future work the application
of the decomposition methodology illustrated here to a model with forward-looking agents and
endogenous capital stocks.
3.2 Baseline Calibration
The economic effects of the Kyoto Protocol depend crucially on the extent to which quantified
emission limitation and reduction objectives (QELROs) bind the economies in the budget period.
In other words, the magnitude and distribution of costs associated with the implementation of
future emission constraints depend on the Business-as-Usual (BAU) projections for GDP, fuel
prices, energy efficiency improvements, etc. In our comparative-static framework we infer the
BAU
 structure of the model’s regions for 2010 using the most recent projections on the economic
development. We measure the economic effects associated with abatement measures relative to
that baseline.
As a starting point for our forward projection, we use the GTAP-E database (Babiker and
Rutherford 1998) which reconciles economic production and trade data (based on GTAP4 -
McDougall 1997) and OECD/IEA energy statistics (IEA 1996) for 1995 - the most recent year
for which a complete set of statistics is available. We use this benchmark data to calibrate
parameters of the CES functional forms from a given set of quantities and prices (given
exogenous elasticities). In a second step, we do the forward calibration of the 1995 economies to
2010 incorporating exogenous information by the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE 1998) for
GDP growth, energy demand and future energy prices. The fossil fuel production functions are
finally calibrated so that they are consistent with exogenous price elasticities of supply.
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4 Policy Simulations and Results
The Kyoto Protocol commits Annex B countries to the reduction of their aggregate CO2
equivalent emissions on average by 5.2% below 1990 levels in the period 2008 to 2012. Table 2
summarizes the individual commitments by the Annex B regions as incorporated in our model.
In our simulation, we assume that Annex B countries apply domestic carbon taxes which
are high enough to meet their individual Kyoto commitments. Carbon tax revenues accrue
directly to the representative agent in each region. This tax policy setting is formally equivalent
to a permit system where the representative agent auctions the region's Kyoto emission budget on
domestic markets. The permit price then coincides with the carbon tax, both measuring the
marginal costs of abatement.
Table 2: Quantified emissions limits under the Kyoto Protocol (Baron et al. 1999)
Region Commitments in % of 1990 greenhouse gas
emissions
CAN: Canada  94
CEA: Central European Associates  93
EUR: European Union and European Free Trade Area  91.5
FSU: Former Soviet Union 100
JPN: Japan  94
OOE: Other OECD 107.3
USA: United States of America  93
4.1 Effective Reduction Requirements and Marginal Abatement Costs
It is important to notice that the effective emission constraint for Annex B countries under the
Kyoto Protocol must be measured against the BAU economic activity without abatement
requirements.11 Because emissions of most Annex B countries grow significantly along the
baseline as compared to 1990 levels, the Kyoto targets which are stated with respect to 1990 as
the base year translate into much higher effective carbon requirements with respect to BAU
emission levels in 2010. For example, OOE is allowed to increase emissions under the Kyoto
Protocol by 7% over 1990 levels, while it faces effectively the need for a decrease by more than
15% from BAU emissions in 2010. The one outlier is FSU whose projected emission levels for
2010 are below 1990 levels due to economic recession and industrial restructuring between 1990
and 2000.
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 See Böhringer, Jensen and Rutherford (2000) for the implications of alternative baseline projections on the
magnitude and distribution of emission abatement costs.
11
Table 3 reports the effective percentage cutbacks joint with the marginal abatement costs
across Annex B countries. The level of abatement is a major determinant of the marginal
abatement costs. The further out we are on the abatement cost curve, the more costly it is - ceteris
paribus - to substitute away from carbon in production and consumption.
Obviously, the marginal abatement costs for FSU are zero because its economic
development will not be constrained by the Kyoto commitment. CEA faces a rather weak
reduction requirement of only 2.3 % with respect to BAU emissions in 2010 which explains the
moderate carbon tax of 11 $US per ton of carbon.
Table 3: Effective reduction requirements and marginal abatement costs
Region % Reduction wrt 1990 % Reduction wrt 2010 Marginal Abatement Cost*
CAN 6 29.9 317
CEA 7 2.2 11
EUR 8.5 18.2 170
FSU 0 -27.2 0
JPN 6 24.3 455
OOE -7.3 17.4 100
USA 7 30.4 287
*$US per ton of carbon
As we move towards higher reduction targets the emission taxes increase significantly
ranging up to 455 $US per ton of carbon for Japan. Comparison of tax rates and reduction
requirements across countries show that the relative cutback requirements are only one
determinant of marginal abatement costs. The latter depend also on differences in carbon
intensity for different sectors across countries. For example, JPN faces much higher carbon taxes
compared to USA or CAN, although its percentage reduction target is smaller. The reason is that
JPN uses relatively little carbon in sectors with low-cost substitution possibilities, e. g. electricity
generation (due to nuclear power). As a consequence, JPN has to cut back relatively more
emissions in other sectors such as traffic where abatement comes more costly at the margin.
4.2 Total Welfare Costs
Table 4 summarizes the welfare implications of Kyoto measured as percentage change in real
consumption with respect to BAU (positive numbers indicate welfare improvements).
We see that abatement policies by Annex B regions produce substantial spillovers to non-
Annex B regions as well as between Annex B regions. Apart from MPC and ROW, all non-
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Annex B countries gain a comparative advantage, i. e. improve their terms of trade (ToT).
Among Annex B countries, FSU, which does not have to impose carbon taxes, faces non-
negligible welfare losses through the deterioration of ToT. On the other hand, CEA experiences a
significant increase in welfare despite the application of domestic carbon taxes; ToT gains for
CEA are obviously large enough to offset the domestic costs of carbon abatement.
Table 4: Total welfare impact of Kyoto
Region % Change wrt BAU consumption
CAN: Canada -1.6
CEA: Central European Associates 0.5
EUR: EU15 and EFTA -0.2
FSU: Russian Federation and Ukraine -0.3
JPN: Japan -0.5
OOE: Australia and New Zealand -1.1
USA: United States -0.9
ASI: Other Asia 0.2
BRA: Brazil 0.3
CHN: China 0.1
IND: India 0.3
MPC: Mexico and OPEC -1.7
ROW: Rest of the World -0.4
World Total -0.5
For all OECD countries (USA, CAN, EUR, JPN, OOE), imposition of the Kyoto targets
leads to economic losses, which is not surprising given their high tax rates.
To understand the welfare effects for the various regions at the aggregate level, it is useful
to distinguish whether (i) regions must abate or not, and (ii) regions are either fossil energy
exporters or importers.
Neglecting ToT effects, the economic impacts should be negative for abating Annex B
countries and zero for non-abating non-Annex B countries. Those Annex B regions which face
binding carbon limits must substitute fossil fuels with more expensive energy sources (fuel
switching) or employ more expensive manufacturing and production techniques (energy savings).
On the consumption side, higher energy prices imply a change in the consumption mix which
results in a loss of welfare (consumer surplus). For a single abating region, the magnitude of
inframarginal welfare losses depends on the level of the marginal abatement costs. Accounting
for ToT, an abating region might pass on some of the price increases in their products to other
countries. Note that burden shifting occurs also among abating countries. For any particular
region, the terms of trade effect is determined by the composition of a scale effect and a
substitution effect. For example, non-abating countries might gain export share for energy
13
intensive goods in abating countries; however, this might be (partially) offset by a reduction in
the scale of exports to abating countries as final demand in those countries shrinks with the rise in
consumer goods prices.
 Energy exporting nations suffer from Annex B abatement policies. The reason is that the
cut in energy demand by the industrialized world12 leads to a drop in producer prices for fossil
fuels. Among fossil energy goods, the decline in prices is most pronounced for carbon-intensive
coal, followed by less carbon-intensive (crude) oil and gas.
Based on the considerations above, we can give further explanation to Table 4. All
developing countries, except for MPC and ROW, are large importers of fossil energies and
benefit from the fall in international energy prices. MPC and ROW are exporters of fossil
energies and face a loss of revenues from energy sales. With respect to trade in energy-intensive
goods, developing countries gain a comparative advantage as compared to OECD countries with
high energy prices. However, for MPC and ROW, this benefit is not large enough to offset the
adverse effect on fossil fuel markets. Like MPC, FSU, as a large energy exporter of oil and gas,
suffers from the decrease in fuel prices. Among abating OECD countries, CEA not only improves
welfare due to lower energy import prices; it also improves its trade position among the heavily
integrated OECD club because it faces by far the lowest carbon taxes. In contrast to all other
OECD countries, CEA does not lose, but gains international competitiveness in energy intensive
production. (The static nature of the model leads to an underestimate of the impacts on global
capital accumulation and growth. The calculated welfare gains observed in energy-importing
developing countries would most likely be absent in a dynamic formulation. See Bernstein,
Montgomery and Rutherford 1999 or Böhringer and Rutherford 2000).
4.3 Decomposition of Total Welfare Impact
Whereas Table 4 conveys information on the magnitude and distribution of costs and gains from
Kyoto for individual regions13 it does not reveal how the total welfare changes can be attributed to
the individual abatement policies across Annex B countries. These contributions by abating
regions provide further insights into the sources of general equilibrium effects and are potentially
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 The expansion in energy use by some non-abating countries is by far too small in order to offset the reduced
demand by Annex-B countries.
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 Note that at the global level binding emission constraints induce a welfare loss as it restricts overall ("first-best")
production and consumption possibilities (see the bottom row "WORLD" of Table 4).
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important for the negotiation of transfer payments at the bilateral level. Application of the HHP
decomposition with respect to carbon taxes in Annex B deliver this information. The results,
presented in Table 5, show the percentage of the welfare cost for each region (rows) attributable
to carbon taxes in each of the Annex B regions (columns). These numbers are obtained along a
line integral in which we change the carbon taxes across abating regions at equal rates starting
from zero and ending with the final carbon taxes as reported in Table 3.
Table 5: Percentage of the welfare cost for each region (rows) attributable to carbon
taxes in each of the Annex B regions (columns)
CAN CEA EUR JPN OOE USA
CAN 92 1 -3 10
CEA 9 11 11 1 67
EUR -15 264 -23 -4 -121
FSU -7 18 30 4 55
JPN -7 -8 165 -4 -47
OOE 1 7 18 58 16
USA 1 -4 -3 -1 107
ASI 10 4 -25 9 102
BRA 10 7 14 1 68
CHN 23 -1 1 -9 3 82
IND 9 7 11 1 73
MPC 8 11 11 70
ROW 7 18 17 1 57
Note that there is no column for Annex B country FSU, simply because FSU does not
have to undertake any action in order to meet its Kyoto commitment. Furthermore, a negative
sign indicates that the effect of the abatement measure by the column region is contrary to the
change in regional welfare of the row region. The diagonal elements for abating regions indicate
the percentage of welfare cost which is due to their own action.
First of all, we see that the contribution of a region from its own abatement measure is
welfare decreasing. This result confirms basic economic intuition that emission constraints
reduce resource productivity and induce income losses. The "own" policy effect varies
substantially across abating regions. While own action is very costly for Europe (more than the
double of the aggregate welfare loss) it has a negligible effect for CEA. The latter can be
explained by the very moderate carbon taxes which are necessary for CEA in order to fulfill its
Kyoto commitment. The larger numbers for all other regions reflect much higher carbon tax
rates.
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Reading Table 5 by rows it follows that action by the USA produces by far the largest
spillovers to other countries. This finding is consistent with the fact that USA plays a major role
on international markets for fossil fuels and must impose rather high carbon taxes to cope with its
Kyoto target. Abatement polices in OOE and CEA on the other hand have very small impacts on
other regions which can be traced back to the moderate tax rates joint with small shares in overall
trade volumes.
 With respect to spillovers from other regions' action we can split the OECD countries in
two groups. For USA and CAN the total welfare impacts are rather independent of the abatement
activities in other OECD countries. This indicates that action by each of their trading partners in
the developed world produce offsetting effects on international markets. On the other hand CEA,
EUR, JPN and OOE are rather sensitive to abatement action by their abating trading partners. The
welfare implications are however opposite for CEA, EUR and JPN as compared to OOE. While
CEA, EUR and JPN benefit from actions of all other OECD countries (in particular from
abatement in the USA) the reverse is true for OOE. FSU is negatively affected by spillovers from
all OECD countries except for CEA.
 Among developing countries IND and BRA gain from action of all OECD countries,
whereas the opposite holds for MPC and ROW. ASI and CHN suffer from high carbon taxes in
JPN but benefit from carbon taxes in all other countries.
We can translate the above percentage changes in welfare from individual policy action
into monetary units. The resulting Table 6 could then be interpreted as a cross-country matrix for
transfer payments which have to be assigned on a bilateral basis in order to provide compensation
for the Kyoto impacts.
Table 6: Compensating transfers from region (rows) to region (column) in billion dollars
annually between 2008 and 2012 (carbon tax policy)
USA CAN EUR JPN OOE FSU
CAN -0.03
EUR 1.45 0.22
JPN 0.96 0.14 -0.13
OOE -0.14 -0.01 -0.09 -0.18
FSU -0.08 -0.03 -0.05 -0.01
CEA 0.10 0.01 0.02 0.02 -0.01
CHN 0.16 0.05 -0.02 0.01
IND 0.08 0.01 0.01 0.01
BRA 0.12 0.02 0.01 0.03
ASI 0.23 0.02 0.01 -0.06 0.02
MPC -1.46 -0.17 -0.23 -0.23
ROW -0.35 -0.04 -0.11 -0.10 -0.01
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In our exposition of compensating transfers we have netted out payments between abating
countries such that we derive net transfers in present value terms. A positive entry indicates
compensation claims of the row region towards the column region. For example, USA should
compensate the OPEC countries plus Mexico (MPC) with roughly 1461 million dollars annually
to offset the adverse impact of its abatement policy on that region. Likewise, Europe has to
transfer nearly the same amount to the USA to make up for the benefits EUR experiences from
USA action
Despite the apparent tidiness of this calculation, there remain substantial uncertainty
regarding the estimated values. One key uncertainty concerns the decomposition procedure itself
because - as we will see below - the decomposition proposed by Harrison, Horridge and Pearson
does not resolve all ambiguities..
Complementary to the decomposition of the total welfare effect using a price instrument
(emission taxes) we could just as easily perform the decomposition using a quantity instrument
(emission permits). For the latter, we reduce the emission budgets of abating countries in equal
proportions, starting from BAU emission levels towards the emission quantities as imposed by
the Kyoto Protocol. The quantity instrument produce exactly the same aggregate changes in
endogenous variables as the price instrument procedure. However, as indicated by comparing
Tables 5 and 7 (or likewise Tables 6 and 8), there are differences in the quantitative estimates for
the contributions by individual policy measures.
Table 7: Percentage of the welfare cost for each region (rows) attributable to emission
permit systems in each of the Annex B regions (columns)
CAN CEA EUR JPN OOE USA
CAN 78 4 18
CEA 9 12 12 1 67
EUR -10 214 -17 -2 -85
FSU -4 -4 26 23 2 57
JPN -5 -5 141 -1 -30
OOE 2 12 22 35 29
USA 2 98
ASI 10 6 -20 4 100
BRA 10 7 14 1 68
CHN 18 4 -4 2 80
IND 8 7 12 1 72
MPC 8 11 12 69
ROW 7 17 17 1 59
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The reason is that the two procedures for approximate the line integrals of individual
policy changes follow a different path through the same outcomes. Obviously, the decomposition
approach proposed by HHP does not resolve all ambiguities. In our policy application, the
qualitative results are largely the same, however there are considerable different magnitudes in
welfare changes and associated potential transfer payments. We therefore conclude that while the
HHP decomposition procedure is insightful, it does not provide an unambiguous estimate of
bilateral transfer payments which would compensate for spillovers from Annex B action.
Table 8: Compensating transfers from region (rows) to region (column) in billion dollars
annually between 2008 and 2012 (carbon tax policy)
USA CAN EUR JPN OOE FSU
CAN -0.04
EUR 1.21 0.18
JPN 0.74 0.12 -0.12
OOE -0.13 -0.01 -0.08 -0.12
FSU -0.09 -0.04 -0.04
CEA 0.10 0.01 0.02 0.02 -0.01
CHN 0.16 0.04 -0.01
IND 0.08 0.01 0.01 0.01
BRA 0.12 0.02 0.01 0.03
ASI 0.22 0.02 0.01 -0.05 0.01
MPC -1.44 -0.17 -0.23 -0.25
ROW -0.36 -0.04 -0.10 -0.10 -0.01
5 Conclusions
In this paper we evaluated the welfare implications of the Kyoto Protocol for the world economy.
We used a new decomposition procedure developed by Harrison, Horridge and Pearson to
investigate the sources of welfare changes across regions induced by greenhouse gas emission
constraints.
Our simulations provide interesting insights into the qualitative interdependencies of
multilateral abatement policies. We have shown that the contributions of individual policy
changes to the overall effect depend on the policy instrument. When we simply change from a
price instrument (taxes) to a quantity instrument (emissions) in order to meet the Kyoto
commitments the quantitative decomposition results change. However, the qualitative results
remain robust suggesting that the decomposition procedure provides a useful starting point for
bilateral negotiations on policy-relevant transfer payments across parties of the Framework
Convention.
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Appendix A: Algebraic Model Summary
This appendix provides an algebraic summary of the equilibrium conditions for our comparative-
static model designed to investigate the economic implications of the Kyoto Protocol in 2010 as
compared to a Business-as-Usual economic development where no carbon abatement policies
apply. Before presenting the algebraic exposition we state our main assumptions and introduce
the notation.
• Nested separable constant elasticity of substitution (CES) functions characterize the use of
inputs in production. All production exhibits non-increasing returns to scale. Goods are
produced with capital, labor, energy and material (KLEM).
• A representative agent (RA) in each region is endowed with three primary factors: natural
resources (used for fossil fuel production), labor and capital. The RA maximizes utility from
consumption of a CES composite subject to a budget constraint with fixed investment (i.e.
fixed demand for the savings good). The aggregate consumption bundle combines demands
for fossil fuels, electricity and non-energy commodities. Total income of the RA consists of
factor income and taxes (including carbon tax revenues).
• Supplies of labor, capital and natural resources are exogenous. Labor and capital are mobile
within domestic borders but cannot move between regions; natural resources are sector
specific.
• All goods, except for crude oil, are differentiated by region of origin. Nested CES functions
characterize the choice between imported and domestic varieties of the same good
(Armington). Crude oil is imported and exported as a homogeneous product.
Two classes of conditions characterize the competitive equilibrium for our model: zero
profit conditions and market clearance conditions. The former class determines activity levels and
the latter determine price levels. In our algebraic exposition, the notation zirΠ  is used to denote
the profit function of sector j in region r where z is the name assigned to the associated
production activity. Differentiating the profit function with respect to input and output prices
provides compensated demand and supply coefficients (Shepard’s lemma), which appear
subsequently in the market clearance conditions. We use i (aliased with j) as index for
commodities (sectors), r (aliased with s) as index for regions and d as index for the demand
category (d=Y: intermediate demand, d=C: private household demand, d=G: investment demand,
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d=I: investment demand). The label EG represents the set of energy goods and the label FF
denotes the subset of fossil fuels. Tables A.1 – A.6 explain the notations for variables and
parameters employed within our algebraic exposition.
A.1 Zero Profit Conditions
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7. Household energy demand:
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A.2 Market Clearance Conditions
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15. Household consumption:
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Table A.1: Sets
i Sectors and goods
j Aliased with i
r Regions
s Aliased with r
EG All energy goods: Coal, crude oil, refined oil, gas and electricity
FF Primary fossil fuels: Coal, crude oil and gas
LQ Liquid fuels: Crude oil, refined oil and gas
d Demand categories: Y = intermediate, C = household and I = investment
Table A.2: Activity variables
irY Production in sector i and region r
irE Aggregate energy input in sector i and region r
irM Aggregate imports of good i and region r
dirA Armington aggregate for demand category d of good i in region r
rC Aggregate household consumption in region r
CrE Aggregate household energy consumption in region r
Table A.3: Price variables
pir
Output price of good i produced in region r for domestic market
pEir
Price of aggregate energy in sector i and region r
pMir
Import price aggregate for good i imported to region r
pAdir
Price of Armington aggregate for demand category d of good i in region r
pC
r
Price of aggregate household consumption in region r
pECr
Price of aggregate household energy consumption in region r
rw
Wage rate in region r
rv
Price of capital services in region r
irq Rent to natural resources in region r (i ∈ FF)
2CO
r
t CO2 tax in region r
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Table A.4: Cost shares
jirθ Share of intermediate good j in sector i and region r (i∉FF)
KLE
irθ Share of KLE aggregate in sector i and region r (i∉FF)
E
irθ Share of energy in the KLE aggregate of sector i and region r (i∉FF)
T
irα Share of labor (T=L) or capital (T=K) in sector i and region r (i∉FF)
Q
irθ Share of natural resources in sector i of region r (i∈FF)
FF
Tirθ Share of good i (T=i) or labor (T=L) or capital (T=K) in sector i and region r (i∈FF)
θ ELEir Share of electricity in energy demand by sector i in region r (i∉FF)
θ COAir Share of coal in fossil fuel demand by sector i in region r
jirβ Share of liquid fossil fuel j in liquid fossil fuel demand by sector i in region r (i∉FF, j∈LQ)
θ Misr Share of imports of good i from region s to region r
θ Adir Share of domestic variety i in Armington aggregate for demand category d in region r
θ ECr Share of energy in aggregate household consumption in region r
irγ Share of non-energy good i in non-energy household consumption demand in region r
θ E rCELE ,, Share of electricity in aggregate household energy consumption in region r
θ EiCr Share of non-electric energy good i in the non-electric household energy consumption in region r
Table A.5: Endowments and emissions coefficients
Lr Aggregate labor endowment for region r
rK Aggregate capital endowment for region r
irQ Endowment of natural resource i for region r (i∈FF)
Br Balance of payment surplus in region r (note: 0=∑
r
rB )
2CO r
Endowment of carbon emission rights in region r
2CO
ia
Carbon emissions coefficient for fossil fuel i (i∈FF) in demand category d of region r
25
Table A.6: Elasticities
KLEσ Substitution between energy and value-added in production (except fossilfuels)
0.3
FFσ Substitution between natural resources and other inputs in fossil fuel
production calibrated consistently to exogenous supply elasticities FFµ .
µCOA=0.5
µCRU=1.0
µGAS =1.0
ELEσ Substitution between electric and non-electric energy in production 0.1
COAσ Substitution between coal and liquid fossil fuel aggregate in production 0.5
Mσ Substitution between imports from different regions 8
Aσ Substitution between the import aggregate and the domestic input 4
CELE ,σ
Substitution between electric and non-electric energy in household energy
consumption
1
NELEσ
Inter-fuel substitution in final fossil fuel demand 2
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Appendix B: Mapping to GTAP-E Sectors and Regions
The regions and sectors of the model are aggregated from the GTAP-E data base which
incorporates most recent harmonized economic and energy data for 45 regions and 23 sectors
(see Babiker and Rutherford 1998).
$TITLE   Aggregation from GTAP_E to 13 regions and 8 goods
Set mapi mapping GTAP-E goods /
GAS.GAS Natural gas works
ELE.ELE Electricity and heat
OIL.OIL Refined oil products
COL.COL Coal transformation
CRU.CRU Crude oil
I_S.EIS Iron and steel industry (IRONSTL)
CRP.EIS Chemical industry (CHEMICAL)
NFM.EIS Non-ferrous metals (NONFERR)
NMM.EIS Non-metallic minerals (NONMET)
TRN.EIS Transport equipment (TRANSEQ)
PPP.EIS Paper-pulp-print (PAPERPRO)
T_T.Y   Trade margins
AGR.Y   Agricultural products
OME.Y   Other machinery (MACHINE)
OMN.Y   Mining (MINING)
FPR.Y   Food products (FOODPRO)
LUM.Y   Wood and wood-products (WOODPRO)
CNS.Y   Construction (CONSTRUC)
TWL.Y   Textiles-wearing apparel-leather (TEXTILES)
OMF.Y   Other manufacturing (INONSPEC)
SER.Y   Commercial and public services
DWE.Y   Dwellings,
CGD.CGD Investment composite /;
SET MAPR  mapping GTAP-E regions /
 AUS.OOE    Australia
 NZL.OOE    New Zealand
 JPN.JPN    Japan
 KOR.ASI    Republic of Korea
 IDN.MPC    Indonesia
 MYS.ASI    Malaysia
 PHL.ASI    Philippines
 SGP.ASI    Singapore
 THA.ASI    Thailand
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 VNM.ASI    Vietnam
 CHN.CHN    China
 HKG.CHN    Hong Kong
 TWN.CHN    Taiwan
 IND.IND    India
 LKA.ASI    Sri Lanka
 RAS.ASI    Rest of South Asia
 CAN.CAN    Canada
 USA.USA    United States of America
 MEX.MPC    Mexico
 CAM.ROW    Central America and Caribbean
 VEN.ROW    Venezuela
 COL.ROW    Columbia
 RAP.ROW    Rest of Andean Pact
 ARG.ROW    Argentina
 BRA.BRA    Brazil
 CHL.ROW    Chile
 URY.ROW    Uruguay
 RSM.ROW    Rest of South America
 GBR.EUR    United Kingdom
 DEU.EUR    Germany
 DNK.EUR    Denmark
 SWE.EUR    Sweden
 FIN.EUR    Finland
 REU.EUR    Rest of EU,
 EFT.EUR    European Free Trade Area
 CEA.CEA    Central European Associates
 FSU.FSU    Former Soviet Union
 TUR.ROW    Turkey
 RME.MPC    Rest of Middle East
 MAR.ROW    Morocco
 RNF.MPC    Rest of North Africa
 SAF.ROW    South Africa
 RSA.ROW    Rest of South Africa
 RSS.ROW    Rest of South-Saharan Africa
 ROW.ROW    Rest of World  /;
